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Murray: Murray: Commercial Law--Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code

RECENT CASES
COMMERCIAL LAW-ARTICLE 4
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE-COMPLETION OF THE
PROCESS OF POSTING
CONSTITUTES FINAL PAYMENT
H. Schultz & Sons, Inc., v. Bank of Suffolk CountyI
On November 26, 1973, Unishops, Inc. drew a check for $40,000 on
the defendant Bank of Suffolk County payable to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff deposited the check for collection with its own bank. The check
was forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and then presented to the defendant bank on November 29. That day the defendant
bank photographed, "proved," and debited the check to Unishops' account. Normally no additional processing would have taken place. 2 The
next day the defendant bank learned of Unishops' bankruptcy and
promptly gave telephone notice of dishonor of the check to the Federal
Reserve Bank.3 The defendant never honored the check.
The plaintiff brought a diversity action in federal district court to obtain the $40,000 face value of the check and sought summary judgment
on the ground that final payment had occurred so that the defendant
bank was accountable for the check under U.C.C. section 4-213. This
contention depended on whether the "process of posting" which would
1. 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The court entered summary
judgment on October 19, 1977. Subsequently, upon defendant's motion for
reargument, the court vacated its original order on December 30, 1977. The
court determined that even under the law as set forth in its opinion additional
facts need be adduced.
2. It was stipulated upon oral argument that the defendant bank had fully
performed its normal procedures regarding the handling of checks. Id. at 1014.
3. The defendant bank thus had actual knowledge of Unishops' bankruptcy.
This is sufficient as notice under the provisions of U.C.C. § 1-201(25), -201(27).
The effect of notice of a customer's bankruptcy is to draw off his funds and so
prevent normal payment of checks drawn on his account. Under § 70(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5)(1970), the trustee takes title to the unencumbered assets of the bankrupt. The trustee may hold the payor bank liable for
the amount of any checks paid after notice of bankruptcy. Consequently, if a
check drawn on the bankrupt's account has not yet been finally paid, the payor
bank would dishonor the check.
4. N.Y. [U.C.C.] § 4-213(1)(c) (McKinney 1964). The New York statute is
identical to U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c). Hereinafter, citations will be made only to the
1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. See note 19 infra.
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constitute final payment under that section had been completed as defined by U.C.C. section 4-109.1 Although it had proven the check and
debited Unishops' account, the defendant bank argued that under subparagraph (e) of section 4-109 it retained discretion to reverse the entry,
and that it could do so properly anytime before midnight of the 30ththe deadline for return of the check. 6 The bank claimed that the process of posting would be deemed completed only at the expiration of this
midnight deadline. The court disagreed and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, stating that reversal of an entry after the
completion of normal processing would be permissible only in the case
where an actual error has occurred. No error occurred in this case;
completion of the defendant bank's standard posting procedures constituted final payment, at which point the defendant became accountable
for the amount of the check.
The Schultz decision is most notable for its rejection of the analysis of
West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange Bank. 7 West Side stands for a
construction of U.C.C. sections 4-213(1)(c) and 4-109 under which the
process of posting is completed and final payment occurs only at the
expiration of the midnight deadline for the return of checks. The court
in Schultz determined that posting would be completed normally at an
earlier point. This is a much sounder approach to the concept of final
payment than that of West Side; it substantially furthers the intent and
policies of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 8
The determination of when final payment occurs is a matter of great
significance in the banking industry. 9 Final payment does not denote
5. See note 22 infra.
6. 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1015. The court pointed out that under the deferred posting practice employed by the defendant and authorized by U.C.C. §
4-301, the latest possible time for the defendant to have returned the check unpaid was the "midnight deadline." As defined by U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(h), the "midnight deadline" is "midnight on [the payor's] next banking day following the
banking day on which it receives the relevant item .. " As the check had been
received on the 29th, midnight of the 30th was the deadline for return. After
that point, the check would have been deemed finally paid under U.C.C. §
4-213(1)(d).
7. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968). Heretofore, West Side has been
the leading though controversial case on § 4-109(e). See note 25 infra. Schultz is
the first case to arise closely in point with West Side.
However, there have been several decisions construing the "process of posting"
under U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c) in a manner inferentially inconsistent with West Side.
Brown v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 1 111. App. 3d 136, 273 N.E.2d 671 (1971);
Security Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 523, 358 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup.
Ct. 1974); Community Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 276 Or. 471, 555 P.2d
435 (1976).
8. According to U.C.C. § 1-102, the Code "shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." See also the official
comment to this section.
9. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 16-4 (1972);
Rohner, Posting of Checks: FinalPayment and the FourLegals, 23 Bus. LAW. 1075,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/6
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the time of transfer of funds or irrevocable credits from the payor bank
to the presenting bank; that moment is called settlement. 10 Rather, final
payment is used to mark an arbitrary point in the check payment process which establishes a multitude of rights and liabilities. At such time
the payor bank becomes accountable to the presenting party for the
amount of the check. 1 ' In turn, any credits given intermediary banks in
provisional settlement are firmed up, and the deposit credit given by the
depositary bank to the payee of the check becomes firm. The check no
longer can be returned because of insufficient funds, forgery, or legal
process affecting the drawer's account (such as a stop payment order or
notice of the drawer's bankruptcy).1 2 Additionally, final payment relieves the drawer of liability on the check to the payee and discharges
any indorsers. 3 As a result of the broad effects of final payment, all
parties to a check have an interest in determination of the point at which
it occurs.

Despite the importance of the concept, prior to the Uniform Commercial Code there existed no clear guide for the determination of final
payment. With respect to items not presented directly, i.e., presented
through intermediary banks like, in Schultz, the Federal Reserve Bank,
the majority rule was that final payment occurred when a payor bank
posted an item to the drawer's account.' 4 However, decisions varied
1077 (1968); Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 331 (1965).
The court in Schultz quoted a passage highlighting the importance of final
payment from Note, Bank Proceduresand the U.C.C. -When Is a Check Finally Paid?,
9 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 957 (1968). 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1013, 1016-17

(1977).
10. U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(j) defines "settlement." The time of final settlement
determines when depositary and collecting banks have a right to obtain the actual proceeds of a check. See U.C.C. § 4-213(2)-(4).
11. U.C.C. § 4-213(1) & comment 7.
12. U.C.C. § 4-213, comment 1.
13. It has been suggested that the discharge of the drawer and indorser follows from U.C.C. § 3-603(1). Note, Final Payment and the Process of Posting Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 349, 350 n.10 (1968). This position does not appear tenable, for the provisions of U.C.C. § 3-603 clearly state:
"The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder .. " (emphasis added). In the normal situation, the payor
makes the payment, not the indorser or drawer.
In the same article two better views are offered. The first is that the "accountability" of the payor established by payment under U.C.C. § 4-213(1) implicitly
relieves other parties of liability on the note. Alternatively, since no code section
specifically deals with this question, one could look to the common law rule.
U.C.C. § 1-103 provides that "unless displaced by the particular provisions [of
the Code] ... the principles of law and equity ...shall supplement its provisions." At common law, final payment of a note discharged the maker and subsequent indorsers. J. BRADY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS § 189, at 313 (2d ed.
1926).
14. First Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 210 Wis. 533, 246 N.W. 593
(1933). Accord, Hay & Stevens v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 Ill.
App. 286 (1927);
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widely from one jurisdiction to another; '5 little reliability could be
placed on any particular procedures. Early attempts at legislative clarification aided little in providing consistency or an acceptable definition.
Section 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law gave a payor a fixed
period of twenty-four hours in which to return an item. 16 If the payor
failed to do so, the item was deemed finally paid and the payor became
accountable. An already confusing situation deteriorated under the burden of a tremendous increase in the volume of checks subsequent to
World War II. The banking industry found an acute need for more time
for processing checks and for consistency in the rules regulating final
payment,1 7 and therefore sought legislation providing a uniform system
of deferred posting.'
The drafters of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code responded
to the need. Section 4-213(1)19 provides a uniform guide as to how final
Union State Bank v. Hibernia State Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18
S.W.2d 93 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929).
15. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 70
(1903) (stamping an item "paid" before charging it to the drawer's account held
to be final payment); Bohlig v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W.2d 445
(1951) (mailing a remittance draft held not sufficient to constitute final payment
because payor could recover the draft from the mail); Dewey v. Margolis &
Brooks, 195 N.C. 307, 142 S.E. 22 (1928) (no final payment until the remittance
draft was received); Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 61 A. 955 (1908)
(prolonged or unreasonable detention of an item-here twenty-four hoursheld to constitute final payment). See Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle iwith Complexity,

1952 Wis. L. REV. 265, 287-95 (1952).
16. This fixed time standard had the advantage of easy application, but the
time allotted was brief. The AMERICAN BANKERS AssOCIATION COLLECTION CODE
§§ 3, 7, reprinted in 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1372, 1373, 1378 (1942), provided that
items presented through the mail were paid either when the amount was debited
to the account of the drawer or at the expiration of the business day of receipt.
The A.B.A. Collection Code provided little uniformity, however, for it was
adopted in only 18 states.
17. See U.C.C. § 4-101, comment. As of 1966, it was estimated that commercial banks in the United States handled over 70 million items daily. Clark,
Check-Out Time for Checks, 83 BANKING L.J. 847, 848 (1966).
18. Deferred posting gives banks an additional period of time to process incoming checks-until the deadline for return, usually midnight of the next
banking day after their receipt. See Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed ReturnsThe Current Check Problem, 62 HARv. L. REV. 905 (1949).

19. U.S.C. § 4-213 provides:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done
any of the following, whichever happens first:
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account
of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the
settlement in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house
rule or agreement.
Upon final payment under subparagraphs ... (c) or (d) the payor
bank shall be accountable for the amount of the item.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/6
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payment may be made, while adequately safeguarding the competing interests of both payor banks and holders of checks. Subparagraph (c)
achieves the objective of sufficiently protecting the interest of the payor
bank by basing the determination of final payment upon the actions of
that bank in its processing of a check. 20 Subparagraph (d), when read
in conjunction with U.C.C. section 4-301, provides assurance to the interest of the holder by setting a time limit, the midnight deadline, for
the payor's completion of its posting process. Unfortunately, ambiguities
persisted, especially due to the lack of any definition of what acts "completed the process of posting" under section 4-213(1)(c).

21

Many banks

employed procedures in which the first step in the process was to charge
a check to the customer's account, and subsequently verified the check.
Bankers feared that this charging might be considered completion of
posting so that an item would be finally paid before it had been
examined and verified.
To eliminate this concern, U.C.C. section 4-109 was offered as a
clarification of the process of posting. 22 This section makes the usual
20. The "process of posting" was used as the determinant of final payment
instead of mere posting because under modern machine operations posting has
become a process. U.C.C. § 4-213, comment 5.
21. Groups of bankers in California and New York, two large commercial
states, were particularly concerned with the ambiguities in the language. New
York opted for legislative clarification of the "process of posting." The result was
a statute defining the term. The Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code subsequently adopted this New York definition, in what is now
U.C.C. § 4-109.
California resolved the ambiguity by deleting subparagraph (1)(c) from §
4-213. The stated reason was that California banks first post and thereafter
examine checks; verification did not appear to be included in the "process of
posting." The California legislature therefore preferred to relate final payment
to failure to revoke within the time allotted by the midnight deadline. MARCH
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY SENATE
FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (1959-1961) PART 1, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 476, cited in CAL. COMM. CODE § 4-213(1), comment 8 (West

AND WARREN REPORT, SIXTH

1964). Only Nevada has followed the California approach. See 1964-65 NEV.
STAT.

ch. 353, § 4-213(1), at 848.

22. Added to the Code in 1962, U.C.C. § 4-109 provides:
The "process of posting" means the usual procedure followed by a
payor bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the payment including one or more of the following or other steps as determined by the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to the item.
The section was added to clarify the provisions of § 4-213(1)(c), not to change
them. U.C.C. § 4-213, comment 5 indicates that the posting process includes
both determining to pay an item and actually recording that determination; §

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 6
1978]

RECENT CASES

739

procedure of each bank the test. It lists common but not necessary steps
which involve the two basic elements of posting: determination to pay an
item and recordation of that determination. The first four subparagraphs describe steps traditionally associated with completion of posting.
However, subparagraph (e) has caused confusion, referring to "correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action" as a possible final step in
the posting process. In West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange Bank 23
the Wisconsin Supreme Court construed this subparagraph to authorize
a bank to reverse an entry to its customer's account for any reason whatsoever. The court held that a payor bank could do so until expiration of
the deadline for return of the entered item. 2 4 Consequently, West Side
took the controversial 2 5 position that because a bank may reverse entries
as part of the posting process, the process remains uncompleted and no
26
final payment occurs until any opportunity for reversal has passed.
The payor bank's completion of its own normal posting process is irrelevant under the West Side analysis.
The dispute in Schultz involved facts only slightly different from those
in West Side. In West Side the payor bank mechanically posted the check,
examined it, and determined to pay it. Before the time limit for return
of dishonored items had expired, the bank received and honored a stop
payment order from its customer.2 7 In Schultz, after completion of its
normal subjective and objective steps in the process of posting, the payor
bank received word of the drawer's bankruptcy and thereafter refused
to pay the check.2 8 Receipt of a stop order and notice of bankruptcy
are two of the "four legals," 29 so termed because of their identical legal

4-109 expressly so provides. In fact, in Community Bank v. United States Nat'l
Bank, 276 Or. 471, 555 P.2d 435 (1976), the court used § 4-109 for guidance in
determining when posting was completed, even though the Oregon statutes did
not then include the section. The court reasoned that such use was permissible
because the section was only a clarification of existing law.
23. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
24. In West Side the deadline for return of an item was modified by clearinghouse agreement to extend past the normal midnight deadline. Id. at 672, 155
N.W.2d at 593. Such agreements are recognized as proper in U.C.C. § 4-103,
comment 3.
25. For the most part, the commentary on the West Side case has been critical.
See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at § 16-4; Malcolm, Reflections on
West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 23 (1968); Rohner, supra
note 9; Note, supra note 9; Note, supra note 13.
However, some commentary has been supportive of the West Side stance. See
Leary & Tarlow, Reflections on Articles 3 and 4 for a Review Committee, 48 TEMPLE
L.Q. 919, 927-33 (1975); Note, Banks-Final Payment-Uniform Comercial Code
Section 4-109 or Clearinghouse Rule?, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 946 (1968).
26. 37 Wis. 2d at 672, 155 N.W.2d at 593.
27. Id. at 665, 155 N.W.2d at 589.
28. 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1014.
29. These four events which may intervene to prevent payment from the

drawer's account are: (1) knowledge of notice of a customer's death, incompehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/6
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effect on the bank collection process: to draw off a customer's funds and
thus prevent normal payment of checks drawn on his account but not yet
finally paid. Therefore, despite the slight factual difference, the question
faced in Schultz was essentially the same as that dealt with in West Side:
whether the "legal" arrived after the check had been finally paid by completion of posting or before final payment, because payment did not become final until the expiration of the return deadline.
The federal district court in Schultz rejected the West Side analysis.3 0
It held that because the defendant bank had completed its normal posting procedures before receipt of notice of its customer's bankruptcy,
final payment had occurred before the arrival of the "legal," and therefore the bank was accountable to the plaintiff. The basis of this holding
was the court's interpretation of subparagraph (e) of U.C.C. section
4-109. The court said reversal of an entry as the final step in posting was
proper only when an actual error had occurred in processing the check.
In arriving at this view, the court first looked to the language of
subparagraph (e) and the ambiguous phrase "correcting or reversing an
entry or erroneous action." Parallel grammatical construction-having
the first verb operate on the first direct object and the second verb operate on the second direct object-results in two readings in which the
presence of an error is the determinative factor. Combinations of each
of the verbs with each of the direct objects would render four readings,
only one of which omits any reference to mistake. The court noted that
"five out of [the] six possible readings of subsection (e) focus upon errors," 31 either mechanical or judgmental. The conclusion was that the
defendant bank should not be permitted to invoke section 4-109(e) because no error had occurred. The court held the bank accountable for
its final payment, buttressing its position by pointing to the legislative
32
intent and policy of the Code as evidenced by the official comments.
The Schultz construction of U.C.C. section 4-109 and the concomitant
effect of fixing final payment at the completion of the process of posting
under section 4-213(1)(c) appear to promote both the intent behind
these sections and the policies underlying Article 4 as a whole. Subparagraph (e) of section 4-109 can be best understood as a concession to
modern processing demands and high-speed techniques.3 3 Fairfax
tency or bankruptcy; (2) the customer's stop order; (3) legal process (for example, garnishment); (4) set-off by the payor bank. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 9, § 17-7.
30. The court referred to the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretation as
"aberrational." 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1018.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1017.
33. The tremendous volume of checks passing through the contemporary
banking system has necessitated the implementation of computerized techniques.
See note 17 supra. Errors arise, but because of the volume of checks they are not
detected immediately.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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Leary, formerly a reporter for the Code, recognized this when he stated
34
that "human error, and sometimes even machine error can creep in."
Prompt handling of checks and settlement of accounts would be impossible if banks were forced to take extraordinary and expensive precautions against the errors which inevitably arise. The listed steps in the
process of posting include "the correction of errors and reversal of entries" 35 to provide some protection to payor banks in case of error.
Nowhere do the Code or its official comments indicate that subparagraph (e) was intended to give banks discretion to fix the time of final
payment by reversal of a nonerroneous entry.
By applying section 4-109(e) as intended, the Schultz approach makes
possible the operation of all of the subparagraphs of sections 4-109 and
4-213. The same is not true under the West Side analysis. West Side renders performance of the acts enumerated in subparagraphs (a) through
(d) of section 4-109 meaningless to determination of posting; posting can
be completed only at the expiration of the deadline for return of an
item. 36 West Side also reads subparagraph (1)(c) of section 4-213 out of
the Code because final payment would occur only at the deadline governed by section 4-213(1)(d), not upon completion of any posting process. 37 Schultz, however, permits final payment to occur before the
deadline through the process of posting; it makes the steps enumerated
in the first four subsections of section 4-109 the normal determinants of
the completion of posting.38 The Code clearly contemplates such a result. Presumably section 4-213(1)(c) has some independent meaning. The
comment to section 4-109 presents three situations as illustrations in

34. Leary, supra note 9, at 360. Accord, Malcolm, supra note 25, at 32.
35. See note 22 supra.
36. The court in Schultz pointed out this effect of the West Side analysis. 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1018.
37. The West Side opinion expressly recognized that its interpretation "would
almost completely negate the possibility of using completion of the 'process of
posting' as the benchmark for determining final payment." 37 Wis. 2d at 669,
155 N.W.2d at 591. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted that
interpretation on the ground that "the meaning of the statute [was] plain and
unambiguous." Id. at 670, 155 N.W.2d at 592.
The fact that the West Side interpretation renders subparagraph (1)(c) of §
4-213 meaningless has been the focal point of the criticism levelled against the
opinion. See generally articles cited note 25 supra. Note, however, that the holding
in the West Side case-that no final payment occurs until expiration of the deadline for return of a check-would be proper in California and Nevada, where
the legislatures have excised subparagraph (1)(c) from their versions of U.C.C. §
4-213. See note 21 supra.
38. The completion of a particular bank's normal processing will almost always constitute final payment. Only when error has occurred in the processing
will there be a postponement of final payment past this point. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/6
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which the process of posting is completed prior to the deadline for re39
turn of a check.
The decision in Schultz is more than a guide to comporting with the
intent behind section 4-109; it furthers several of the broader policies
and considerations of Article 4. Most significantly, the decision promotes
the prompt handling and quick retirement of checks. The importance of
this to the draftsmen of the Code is evidenced by the provisions of section 4-213 relating to final payment. The preamble of the section states
that a check is finally paid when the first of the events in the subparagraphs which follow occurs. This language clearly manifests a desire to
minimize the period of time before final payment occurs. 40 Another
41
general policy of the Code is to limit the liability of collecting banks.
Schultz advances this policy by making it possible and even likely to have
final payment at a point earlier than the midnight deadline. The earlier
the time of final payment, the smaller the likelihood that notice of a stop
order will arrive to extend a collecting bank's liability.
Although it will not affect the soundness of the Schultz approach in
this factual situation, there is a latent problem in the court's opinion
which could greatly confuse this area of banking law. That problem
arises from the court's brief reference to the applicability of U.C.C. section 4-303(1)(d). Although it based its decision squarely upon sections
4-109 and 4-213, the court cited section 4-303(1)(d) for the proposition
that if the bank had completed posting, the notice of its customer's
42
bankruptcy came too late to affect its accountability to the plaintiff.
This section provides that legal process such as notice of bankruptcy or a
stop order comes too late to terminate the payor bank's right or duty to
pay an item after the bank has completed the process of posting or evidenced its decision to pay the item. 43 Several commentators, notably

39. U.C.C. § 4-109, comment.
40. The comments to the Code reinforce this notion that the section was
drafted to make the earliest of four events constitute final payment. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 4-213, comment 7. In fact, the only reason for permitting postponement of final payment until the midnight deadline is to give a payor bank a
chance to examine the item. Once that examination has been concluded and the
item has been fully processed, there is no reason to allow further time.
41. See U.C.C. § 4-201.
42. 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1015.
43. U.C.C. § 4-303(1) provides:
(1) Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process
served upon or setoff exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules of law to terminate, suspend or modify the
bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge its customer's account
for the item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend or modify such
right or duty if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is
received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon
expires or the setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of the
following:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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Walter Malcolm, 44 a principal draftsman of Article 4, and Professors
White and Summers, 45 urge the use of this section instead of section
4-213(1) in the West Side and Schultz situation. The rationale for this
suggestion appears to be that section 4-303(1)(d) deals specifically with
the effect of the "four legals" on a bank's duty to pay an item. However,
analysis indicates that this section does not apply under the Schultz facts.
Two reasons strongly militate against deciding the issue of the liability
of the payor bank to the payee or holder in a case such as Schultz under
section 4-303(1)(d). First, the real question in such a lawsuit concerns the
accountability of the payor to the payee or holder. U.C.C. section
4-213(1) expressly provides that the payor shall be accountable upon
final payment. The ultimate determination of a plaintiff payee's (or
holder's) right to the amount of the check hinges on the ability to show
final payment has been made, for example, by completion of the process
of posting. 46 In contrast, U.C.C. section 4-303(1) does not govern accountability of the payor to the payee or holder on the check. This section only establishes rules governing whether customer-derived legal
claims can affect the payor. 47 A bank's "duty" to pay is owed only to the
drawer, not to the payee or holder. The legislative background of section 4-303(1) reinforces this notion. The New York Law Revision Commission plainly resolved that the section "has no effect in itself to give
48
the holder of an 'item' a right to payment."

Secondly, application of section 4-303(1)(d) to give a payee or holder a
right to payment could confuse the law due to patent differences between the acts required to trigger this section and the acts necessary

(d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account
of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith or
otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and
by action its decision to pay the item; ...

44. Malcolm, supra note 25, at 26-31.
45. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 17-7.
46. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
47. The official comments to this section illustrate that it does not regulate
accountability of payor to a payee or holder. "[Holders have no direct right
against the payor bank in any event, unless of course, the bank has accepted [ §
3-410], certified [ § 3-411], or finllly paid [ § 4-213] a particular item .. " U.C.C.
§ 4-303, comment 6. Furthermore, when notice or a stop-order comes too late,
e.g., after a payor has complied with § 4-303(1)(d), "the item has priority and a
charge to the customer's account may be made and is effective." U.C.C. § 4-303,
comment 2 (emphasis added). There appears to be no indication whatsoever that
this section requires the payor to pay the item at a holder's insistence.
48. The resolution is quoted in Malcolm, supra note 25, at 29. See NEW YORK
LAW REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT AND APPENDICES RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE FOR 1956, at 429 (adoption of this resolution). These Commission

reports are a type of "legislative history" to this section of the Code. New York
was a key state in determining ultimate acceptance of the Code, and its suggestions carried great weight with the draftsmen.
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